## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

	United	OAKLAND DIVISION  Case No. 19-Cr-00098 JSu
	Saul	Plaintiff,  V.  Plaintiff,  V.  STIPULATED ORDER EXCLUDING TIME  SUSAN Y. SOUNG CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT OF CALIFORN WINDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT  NORTH DISTRICT OF CALIFORN WINDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT  OAKLAND OFFICE  OAKLAND OAKLAND OFFICE  OAKLAND OAKLAND OFFICE  OAKLAND OAKLAND OAKLAND
For the	reacon	Defendant(s).  Solution on the record on $\frac{4}{12}$ , the court excludes time under the Speedy
Trial Act from 4 12 19 to 5 21 19 and finds that the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). The court makes this finding and bases this continuance on the following factor(s):		
		Failure to grant a continuance would be likely to result in a miscarriage of justice. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i).
	,	The case is so unusual or so complex, due to [check applicable reasons] the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or the trial itself within the time limits established by this section. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii).
		Failure to grant a continuance would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. <i>See</i> 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).
		Failure to grant a continuance would unreasonably deny the defendant continuity of counsel, given counsel's other scheduled case commitments, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).
		Failure to grant a continuance would unreasonably deny the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).
		With the consent of the defendant, and taking into account the public interest in the prompt disposition of criminal cases, the court sets the preliminary hearing to the date set forth in the first paragraph and — based on the parties' showing of good cause — finds good cause for extending the time limits for a preliminary hearing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1 and for extending the 30-day time period for an indictment under the Speedy Trial Act (based on the exclusions set forth above). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1; 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b).
	IT IS	SO ORDERED.
	DATE	
		DONNA M. RYU  United States Magistrate Judge
	STIPU	PLATED: Matty
		Attorney for Defendant Assistant United States Attorney